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Philosophy Corner: Ontology | by MatthewDBA | 2009-08-24 06:51:21 |
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A self-evidential event of the subjective ego | by bitflipper | 2009-08-24 07:26:49 |
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Would be Descartes-esque. | by krikkert | 2009-08-24 07:33:06 |
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Actually, I was thinking more of conditions that | by bitflipper | 2009-08-24 07:38:07 |
| As with anything like this, we need a framework... |
by jdelphiki |
2009-08-24 08:02:09 |
...of definitions upon which we can build any argument we're going to make.
To wit: what IS a thought?
Bitfli, the answer to your question about consciousness depends largely on where we set the yardstick for measuring what is or isn't a thought. Does a thought have to presume awareness or are there subconscious or automatic "thoughts" that can occur when your conscious mind is taking a break?
For instance, if you're unconscious, but able to dream, some part of your brain is still processing a level of awareness (or trying to do so, at least). It'd be pretty easy to say then that you're still thinking.
On the other hand, if you're entirely unconscious, with no part of your conscious mind tracking what's going on in your brain, is it STILL possible that you've got thoughts going on there? Could those "thoughts" be defined broadly enough to include the autonomic processes that keep you alive?
The problem with questions like this is that you have to make basic assumptions in order to set the framework of the argument.
It would be safe to assume that a "thought" could be narrowed down to include only those mental messages processed (in some part) by the conscious mind. But in doing so we automatically narrow the framework of possible answers to exclude ideals that might (or might not) fit into the framework. In some ways, it makes determining the answers easier, but it also leaves strange inconsistencies that *can't* be explained unless we trek outside the framework we've created for our arguments.
An example of this would be the question of whether or not animals (non-human) are capable of thought.
If we allow that thought has to be based on self-awareness, we create a conundrum for animals who *appear* to have thought, but who don't seem to have the same "human" awareness that we've used to define what "thought" is.
To me, the answer is much broader and thereby, much trickier to pin down. |
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[ Reply ] |
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Exactly. | by MatthewDBA | 2009-08-24 08:04:09 |
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How about "adaptive behavior"? | by bitflipper | 2009-08-24 08:30:22 |
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That's an interesting approach. | by MatthewDBA | 2009-08-24 08:34:59 |
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Perhaps it does | by bitflipper | 2009-08-24 09:26:36 |
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How would you be able to tell | by MatthewDBA | 2009-08-24 09:33:52 |
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No, an external test is sufficient | by bitflipper | 2009-08-24 09:47:07 |
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I'm not as sure as you seem to be | by MatthewDBA | 2009-08-24 09:59:26 |
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Most programs are written deliberately to assist | by bitflipper | 2009-08-24 10:47:04 |
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You can determine whether another person | by MatthewDBA | 2009-08-24 10:51:07 |
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How is it absent? | by bitflipper | 2009-08-24 11:16:26 |
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I'm wondering if things like | by MatthewDBA | 2009-08-24 11:28:16 |
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But, again, would a conversation with a strong AI | by bitflipper | 2009-08-24 11:52:24 |
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One difference between | by MatthewDBA | 2009-08-24 12:28:51 |
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Yes, but, by market statistics, most people | by bitflipper | 2009-08-24 13:11:20 |