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Is science based in fact or belief? | by subbywan | 2007-01-22 16:28:58 |
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Science is based on belief supported by fact. | by hadji | 2007-01-22 16:35:24 |
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but could it be the reason it's faith-based | by subbywan | 2007-01-22 16:36:58 |
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That's a pointless statement though. | by hadji | 2007-01-22 16:39:05 |
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But per the scientific method, | by subbywan | 2007-01-22 16:47:26 |
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Sounds like a semantic problem. | by vetitice | 2007-01-22 16:55:09 |
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It may very well be. | by subbywan | 2007-01-22 17:01:28 |
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Who's this 'we', kemo sabe? | by vetitice | 2007-01-22 17:13:50 |
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But very large portions of science have | by subbywan | 2007-01-22 17:22:55 |
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OK, I think I see where you're taking this. | by vetitice | 2007-01-22 17:38:50 |
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ARGH!! you did it!! :P | by subbywan | 2007-01-22 17:40:59 |
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Talk to Goedel. | by vetitice | 2007-01-22 17:46:18 |
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Nothing to be sorry about. That's the point of the | by subbywan | 2007-01-22 17:56:33 |
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What godel proved is that there are some things | by Arachnid | 2007-01-22 18:00:45 |
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Proved? | by subbywan | 2007-01-22 18:02:30 |
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No, he's proved it. It is in no way an assumption. | by Arachnid | 2007-01-22 18:11:49 |
| By that article itself, it lists there are limits |
by subbywan |
2007-01-22 18:20:32 |
"The conclusions of Gödel's theorems only hold for the formal systems that satisfy the necessary hypotheses (which have not been fully described in this article). Not all axiom systems do satisfy these hypotheses, even when these systems have models that include the natural numbers as a subset. For example, there are first-order axiomatizations of Euclidean geometry and real closed fields that do not meet the hypotheses of Gödel's theorems. The key fact is that the first-order languages used by these axiomatizations are not expressive enough to define the set of natural numbers or develop basic properties of the natural numbers.
A second limitation is that Gödel's theorems only apply to systems that are used as their own proof systems. Gentzen's work shows the consequences of using a proof theory that is not the same theory, but a more powerful one"
By it's very nature, it claims this is not a be-all-to-end-all theories, but that it only applies to particular situations. While they may be wide-ranging and cover vast swathes of knowledge, it does not cover all.
It absolutely makes assumptions. At least two are listed there:
1)Gödel's theorems only apply to systems that are used as their own proof systems
and
2) The conclusions of Gödel's theorems only hold for the formal systems that satisfy the necessary hypotheses.
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[ Reply ] |
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Certainly | by Arachnid | 2007-01-22 18:24:57 |
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I agree. The universe might be one | by subbywan | 2007-01-22 18:28:18 |
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We don't need to prove it is one. | by Arachnid | 2007-01-22 18:38:16 |
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How much of what we have proved do we | by subbywan | 2007-01-22 18:53:58 |
