| can only be known from its perception doesn't mean that it doesn't exist without that perception. That's part of a Platonistic understanding of God: as ... I can't remember his name, a contemporary theologian ... said, "To be God is to be to-be." That is, one definition of God could be "that whose nature is to exist". Thus, the ideal of a chair is not simply something we perceive, but something that just is, independent of our perception.
As far as the empirical view: I could perhaps "show" you this God of which/whom I speak, but how do we decide on the rules governing evidence of God's existence? As far as whether there is reason to prefer his concept of "chair" to (e.g.) yours as an ideal (supposing that we agree that he exists), the reasoning above still holds: His concept of chair is preferred because it exists independent of perception.
|
